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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
PROVISIONS AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION:
THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF ESTABLISHED TORT CAUSES
OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
Abstract" Several state courts interpret their states' constitutional remedy provisions as
justifying heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative alterations in tort law. This confers
greater protection of tort causes of action and remedies established at the time of the state
constitution's adoption. This Comment considers whether article I, section 10 of the
Washington constitution can support such an interpretation. Additionally, the author discusses the existing interpretations of other states' remedy provisions and suggests a heightened scrutiny model that best balances the interest in retaining already recognized tort
remedies against the interest in fostering positive change.

The Washington Supreme Court declared more than half a century
ago that the state constitution lacked a remedy provision.1 One commentator, however, recently argued that article I, section 10, which
provides that "D]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay," 2 could be construed as a remedy provision that allows heightened judicial scrutiny of tort legislation.3 At
Copyright Washington Law Review 1989.
I. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 160-61, 53 P.2d 615, 622 (1936) ("[i]n this state, the
constitution contains no such [remedy] provision, but only the general "due process" and "equal
protection" clauses. There is, therefore, no express, positive mandate of the constitution which
preserves such [tort] rights of action from abolition by the legislature").
Remedy provisions are often referred to as "open court" or "access to courts" provisions. See
Wiggins, Harnitiaux & Whaley, Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the State Constitution:
Testing the Limits 22 GONz. L. REv. 193, 201 nn.44-45 (1986/87) [hereinafter Wiggins]; see
also Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts Under State Constitutional Law: An
Impediment to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Important Substantive and Procedural
Rights?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 399 n.1 (1982).
On the utility of a state constitutional remedy provision, see infra, notes 20-41 and
accompanying text.
2. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. Article I, section 10 is involved in other current topics that will
not be discussed in this Comment. It has been the focus of litigation involving the exclusion of
the public from criminal trials. See Cohen, Cameras in the Courtroom and Due Process: A
Proposalfor a QualitativeDifference Test, 57 WASH. L. REv. 277, 288 (1982). The provision also
is the foundation to the right to a speedy trial. See State ex reL James v. Superior Court, 32
Wash. 2d 451, 202 P.2d 250 (1949).
3. See Wiggins, supra note 1, at 200-01, 211-20, 230-31; see also Comment, supra note 1, at
399 n.1.
This Comment only addresses the application of remedy provisions to tort law. Whether
remedy provisions affect changes to other areas of law, such as contract or property law, will not
be answered in this analysis.
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least thirty-five state constitutions include remedy provisions.' Several
states interpret remedy provisions as allowing some level of heightened
scrutiny of statutes which alter or eliminate a common law or statutory cause of action.' In light of the modem trend toward limiting
4. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIZ. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 6; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 10; DEL
CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights § 18; Ky. CONST., Bill of Rights § 14; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MASS. CONST. art. XI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONsT.
art. I, § 13; N.H. CONsT. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONsT. art. I,
§ 17; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONsT. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 4, ch. II, § 28;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; Wis. CONsT. art I, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
There seem to be two major formats of remedy provisions. Comment, supranote 1, at 399 n.2.
Connecticut Constitution, article I, section 10 is typical: "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." Other states
with provisions patterned after this model, though with minor variations, include Alabama,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, Oregon, Ohio, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
The second major variation typically reads like the Maine Constitution, article I, section 19:
"Every person, for an injury done him in his person, reputation, property or immunities, shall
have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered freely and without
sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay." Other states with similar
formats in their remedy provisions, with some minor variations, include Arkansas, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Article II, section 11 of the Arizona Declaration of Rights is the only state constitutional
provision identical to the Washington version, reading: "Justice in all cases shall be administered
openly, and without unnecessary delay." However, the Arizona courts have not construed a
remedy guarantee from this provision because article XVIII, section 6 clearly expresses the right
to a remedy in modern language: "The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never
be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
The Montana Constitution also attempts to be unusually specific with its remedy provision.
Article II, section 16(3) expressly allows for modification or abolishment of remedies by the
legislature, "except that any express dollar limits on compensatory damages for actual economic
loss for bodily injury must be approved by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature."
Florida's article I, section 21 is also drafted in more modern language: "The courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay."
The format in which a remedy clause is drafted has little bearing upon the level of scrutiny
attached to the clause by the state court. For example, while the Alabama courts construe their
state's constitutional remedy provision as providing a means of strict judicial scrutiny of
legislation, Tennessee attaches no such interpretation to its remedy provision. Compare
Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978) (Alabama state constitutional remedy provision
as source of heightened scrutiny) with Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978)
(Tennessee state constitutional remedy provision does not mandate judicial scrutiny of
legislation).
5. For an overview of the different levels of judicial scrutiny associated with remedy
provisions, see infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.

State Constitutional Remedy Provisions
tort recovery in response to the "insurance crisis," 6 the time is ripe for
reconsideration whether the abolition and modification of tort actions
and remedies merit special judicial scrutiny.
This Comment will consider whether article I, section 10 of the
Washington Constitution provides a right to a remedy for tort claims.
In doing so, the common law origins of remedy clauses in the United
States and their relationship with the drafting of Washington's article
I, section 10 will be examined first. Second, although it is beyond the
scope of this Comment to examine exhaustively the treatment of remedy provisions in all thirty-five jurisdictions, the three major judicial
interpretations that contribute to the heritage of Washington's article
I, section 10 will be reviewed. Finally, this Comment will consider the
desirability of adopting judicial scrutiny of legislation dealing with
remedies.
I. COMMON LAW ORIGINS
A.

The Magna Carta

The impetus for remedy provisions can be traced to the thirteenth
century abuses of King John of England. Access to the King's medieval courts meant paying for a writ, and an especially speedy and
potent writ could be had for a fatter fee.7 For this and other abuses,
the barons forced King John to sign the Magna Carta in 1215.8 Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta addressed the problem of overpriced writs,
stating "[t]o no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right
or justice." 9
6. See generally Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 317 (1987) (articles
evaluating federal and state developments in response to rising liability insurance rates).
For commentary on Washington State's 1986 Tort Reform Act, see Peck, Constitutional
Challenges to the PartialRejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and
Several Liability Made by the 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act, 62 WASH. L. REv. 681 (1987);
Peck, Washington's PartialRejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and
Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REv. 233 (1987); Comment, supra note 1; Comment,
ConstitutionalChallengesto Washington's Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal
Injury and Death, 63 WASH. L. Rnv. 653 (1988).
7. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING
JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914).
8. Id. at 395-96.
9. Id. at 395.
American state courts which interpret remedy provisions recognize the Magna Carta as the
progenitor of such provisions. Eg., Davidson v. Rogers, 281 Or. 219, 574 P.2d 624, 625 (1978)
(Linde, J., concurring).
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B. Sir Edward Coke and the American Revolution
It took four and a half centuries for Chapter 40 to give birth to the
remedy guarantee. In his Second Institute, Sir Edward Coke interpreted the meaning of "justice" in Chapter 40 to encompass a remedy
guarantee.' ° Coke's pronouncement of a remedy guarantee became
highly influential despite its questionable accuracy."' His work clearly
influenced American ideas of government and jurisprudence during
the Revolutionary period.' 2 Coke's idea of a remedy guarantee sur10. On Chapter 40, Coke wrote:
And therefore every Subject of this Realm, for injury done to him in [goods, lands, or
person] ... may take his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice and right for the
injury done him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.
Hereby it appeareth, that Justice must have three qualities, it must be [free, for nothing is
more iniquitous than justice for sale; complete, for justice should not do things by halves;
swift, for justice delayed is justice denied;] and then it is both Justice and Right.
Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee:Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L.
REV. 35, 38 & n.19 (1986) (quoting E. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE 55-56 (4th ed. 1671) and
translating bracketed portions from Latin into English).
Chapter 40 was merged with Chapter 39 ("[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land") into Chapter 29 of Henry III's
version of the Magna Carta of 1225. A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA
CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 284 (1968); W. McKECHNIE, supra note 7, at
375. Chapter 29 of the Henry III reissue read:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or dissei[z]ed of any freehold, or liberties, or
free customs, or outlawed or banished, or in any other way destroyed, nor will we go upon
him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.
To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice.
W. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND LEGACY 316-17 (1965), reprinted in Comment,
supra note 1, at 399-400. This merging of the two chapters of the Magna Carta apparently
explains why "due process" language is sometimes associated with remedy provisions. See, e.g.,
Harrington, The Texas Bill of Rights and Civil Liberties, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1487, 1523-24
(1986) (characterizing Texas' remedy provision, article I, section 13, "[a]ll courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law," as a "due process" guarantee, "non-coterminous" with the other
"due process" guarantee of article I, section 19).
11. On Coke's influence, Professor Max Radin commented:
As a judge, he was a stout champion of the Common Law in its narrowest sense-a bitter
opponent of the Prerogative Courts, including the Chancery, and a still more determined
opponent of any attempt at a radical change in the Common Law. His general learning was
wide and inaccurate. His legal learning was portentous but unscrupulously applied. He had
no sense of historical criticism and no hesitation in distorting his data.
M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 285 (1936).
12. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
30-31 (1967).
William Penn's Frame of Government of Pennsylvania of 1682 relied heavily on Coke, and
Article V incorporated the Magna Carta's Chapter 40, "[t]hat all courts shall be open, and justice
shall neither be sold, denied nor delayed." SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 217 (R. Perry & J.
Cooper eds. 1978). James Otis' obsession with Coke's ideas helped drive Otis insane. See, e.g.,
G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 9 (1969).
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faced in five revolutionary declarations of rights."3 When the final version of the federal Bill of Rights, which lacked any remedy language,
was submitted for the states' approval, at least two states-North Carolina and
Virginia-suggested adding remedy language to the Bill of
14
Rights.

C. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Blackstone's Commentaries, published between 1765 and 1769, was
the most influential common law treatise in both England and
America. 15 The Commentaries appealed to eighteenth-century Americans owing to Blackstone's alleged ability to extract general principles
from the common law. 16 He deduced that the English common law
protected three "principal" rights: "[T]he right of personal security,
13. For example, DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 12 reads:

That every freeman for every injury done him in his goods, lands or person, by any other
person, ought to have remedy by the course of the law of the land and ought to have justice
and right for the injury done to him freely without sale, fully without-any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.
Reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 277 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971)
[hereinafter B. Schwartz]. See also MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XVII, reprinted
in B. Schwartz, supra, at 281; MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1780, pt. I, art. XI, reprinted
in B. Schwartz, supra, at 342; N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1783, art. XIV, reprintedin B. Schwartz,
supra, at 377; N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XIII, reprinted in B. Schwartz,

supra, at 287.
14. On June 27, 1788, the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in approving the Federal
Constitution, made proposals for the then yet to be drafted Bill of Rights. Among its proposed
amendments, the Virginia delegation included:
12th. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all
injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain
right and justice freely, without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay, and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights are oppressive
and unjust.
Reprinted in B. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 841.
A little over a month later, the North Carolina Ratifying Convention resolved on August 1,
1788 that a declaration of rights should include:
12. That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all
injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain
right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without
delay; and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights are oppressive
and unjust.
Reprinted in B. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 967-68.
Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court suggests that a provision imposing an affirmative
right to "remedy in due course of law" would have made little sense in a Bill of Rights that was
meant to "limit" the federal government. Linde, Without "Due Process": UnconstitutionalLaw
in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 138 n.38 (1970).
15. Eg., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209
(1979); SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 12, at 334-35.

16. Eg., G. WOOD, supra note 12, at 10 ("[tlhe great appeal for Americans of Blackstone's
Commentaries stemmed not so much from its particular exposition of English law... but from
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the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property ....

','

When the right of personal security is breached, by assault for example, the injured party is due "a pecuniary satisfaction in damages
.... ," The fact that Blackstone saw fit to classify personal physical
integrity as something that today would be called a fundamental right,
evinces the deep, philosophical importance of tort compensation in the
Anglo-American legal tradition. 9
II.

THREE MODELS OF INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY PROVISIONS

The purpose of article I, section 10 remains unclear despite an
examination of the Washington Constitutional Convention's existing
papers. In choosing the best interpretation of this provision, it is illuminating to consider the three basic approaches of other state courts
which already have interpreted their states' remedy provisions. By
analyzing each approach-"strict scrutiny," "no restriction," and
"intermediate scrutiny"-the conflict between the interest in reform
and the interest in maintaining well-established doctrine will become
apparent.
A.

"Strict Scrutiny" Model

State courts which follow the "strict scrutiny" model interpret state
constitutional remedy provisions as requiring heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation that would change or eliminate tort law recovery.
In strict scrutiny states, the burden is upon the legislature to show
either an overpowering public necessity for the change and that no less
restrictive alternative was available, or show that the change supplies a
reasonable alternative in place of the superseded tort remedy. It therefore becomes difficult for the legislature to make substantial changes in
tort law without a detailed articulation of the need for change.
The Florida Supreme Court applies a strict scrutiny test to statutory
changes affecting remedies.2" In Kluger v. White,2' Florida's no-fault
its great effort to extract general principles from the English common law and make of it, as
James Iredall said, 'a science.' ").
17. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
18. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *116.
19. On Blackstone's continuing influence in America, see Kennedy, supra note 15, at 210-11.
20. E.g., Wiggins, supra note 1, at 215.
The Kentucky high court utilizes a variation on the strict scrutiny standard. In Saylor v. Hall,
497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973), overruled on itsfacts, Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982),
the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided the state's constitutional remedy provision prevented the
legislature from abolishing rights of action established prior to the adoption of the state
constitution. "It was the manifest purpose of the framers of [the constitution] to preserve and
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automobile statute22 was challenged as unconstitutional under Florida's constitution, article I, section 21,23 because it effectively denied
recovery for property damage under $550.24 The Florida Supreme
Court held that the deprivation of a remedy in a property cause of
action was unconstitutional in light of the state's constitutional remedy guarantee provision.2 5
The Kluger court reasoned that the Florida remedy provision
encompassed all statutory and common law remedies recognized in
Florida prior to the state constitution's adoption. However, the Florida Supreme Court went on to adopt a test that would allow the legislature to abolish a constitutionally-protected remedy under two
circumstances. First, if the legislature supplied "a reasonable alternative" in place of the superseded cause of action, the old remedy was no
longer protected since a new remedy was available.2 6 Second, if the
state legislature could "show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such
perpetuate the common-law right of a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to sue to
recover damages for his injury." Id. at 222-23 (quoting Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49
S.W.2d 347 (1932)). Under this doctrine, since "[r]ecovery is not possible until a cause of action
exists," a statute of repose so short as to prevent a cause of action against building contractors
from ever arising violated the right to remedy. Id. at 224-25. The Saylor result itself was
overruled on its facts in Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1,982) (Saylor decision incorrect
because court failed to consider whether remedy against building contractor existed at time of
constitution's adoption in 1891).
21. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
22. The pertinent portion of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.732 (West 1971) provided, "an owner
who has elected not to purchase insurance with respect to property damage to his motor vehicle
may maintain an action of tort therefore against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a
motor vehicle causing such damage if such damage exceeds five hundred and fifty dollars ......
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 3.
23. "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
24. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 2-3.
25. [Where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been
provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common
law of the State ... the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without
providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress
for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can
be shown.
Id. at 4. Compare this language with the strict scrutiny language applied in due process and
equal protection cases involving fundamental rights protected by the federal Constitution, infra
notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
The "reasonable alternative" requirement is sometimes known as the "adequate remedy doctrine" or "quid pro quo." Eg., Wiggins, supra note 1, at 200.
26. Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
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public necessity can be shown," the old remedy was permissibly
abolished.27
An example of a "reasonable alternative" is the typical workmen's
compensation scheme, abolishing the right to sue an employer for an
employee's injury arising from the employment relationship in return
for statutorily mandated compensation. The Kluger court noted that
the compensation scheme provided "adequate, sufficient, and even
preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job
...."28 An illustration of the "overwhelming public necessity" exception is the abolition of the right of action for alienation of affections. 29
B.

"No Restriction" Model

A second category of states interpret their remedy clause as not
requiring any heightened judicial scrutiny of changes in substantive
31
3
law. This "no restriction" model " takes three different forms.
First, some courts view their states' remedy provisions as directed only
at the judiciary and not the legislature, leaving the legislature free to
abolish any causes of action not yet vested.3 2 A second approach
holds that a remedy provision preserves only procedural rights and
does not place limits upon the legislature's ability to change substantive rights.3 3 Under the third line of thought, the courts recognize no
state constitutional limitations upon the legislative power to alter or
abolish common law causes of action or remedies.3 4
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (construing Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948)).
30. The phrase "no restriction theory" originated in Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Repose: An UnconstitutionalDenial ofAccess to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150, 171-73 (1983).
This phrase is used here to promote uniformity in the terminology used in discussing remedy
provisions.
31. See id. at 171.
32. E.g., Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. 1978) (remedy provision, "all
courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay," a "mandate to the judiciary and not ...a limitation upon the legislature").
33. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (1971) (plaintiff challenging .
no-fault automobile insurance scheme unable to recover under article 11 guarantee of "a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs" since article 11 is "clearly
directed toward the preservation of procedural rights and has been so construed.").
34. See, e.g., O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344, 346 (1972)
(article II, section 6 of Colorado constitution, "[c]ourts of justice shall be open to every person,
and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character," did not disallow
the legislature from changing the law which previously created a right, "[r]ather, this section
simply provides that if a right does accrue under the law, the courts will be available to effectuate
such right").
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C. "IntermediateScrutiny" Model
The "intermediate scrutiny" model also interprets state constitutional remedy provisions as requiring heightened judicial scrutiny of
changes in tort law. Unlike strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny
model assumes that the change is constitutional. The burden is upon
the litigant to show that the change is "unreasonable or arbitrary"
when compared with the purpose and basis of the new statute. For
example, the Texas high court drew upon its state's constitutional
remedy provision3 5 to adopt a two-step balancing test that weighs the
litigant's interest in a previously recognized cause of action against the
purpose and basis of the statutory change.
The Texas Supreme Court formulated this balancing test in Sax v.
Votteler.36 Sax dealt with a medical malpractice statute of limitations
that limited suits for children under six years of age to the later of two
years following the breach or injury, or until they reached the age of
eight.37 Under the first step of the balancing test, the Sax court found
that the right of a minor to sue for injuries due to another's negligence
was long-recognized by the Texas courts.3 8 Under the second step, the
court found the purpose of the statute-controlling insurance rateswas legitimate. However, the court in Sax found the means were not
reasonable because eliminating the ability to sue in such a manner was
overly restrictive when weighed against a child's right to obtain
redress. 39 The statute was therefore held to have violated the remedy
guarantee.4°

35. "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods,
person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
Texas has interpreted the "due course of law" language as a due process guarantee, separate
from the due process guarantee of article I, section 19, "[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived
of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the
due course of the law of the land." This helps explain how due process language has become
closely related to remedy provisions in Texas. See Harrington, supra note 10, at 1520-25.
36. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).

37. Id. at 663.
38. Id. at 666.

39. Id. at 667.
40. Id. Other states which utilize a heightened scrutiny standard include Alabama. See
Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978) (amendment to workmen's compensation act
denying right of action against negligent co-employee by injured employee unconstitutional
under right to remedy provision where amendment offers neither a substitute remedy nor a
showing of social evil overcome by the legislative change).
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III. TORT REMEDY PROTECTIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
The United States Supreme Court generally has held that the federal due process and equal protection clauses do not protect against
changes in tort law. Consequently, state constitutional remedy provisions have become an important way to fill the void in federal constitutional theory.
A.

Due Process Clause Protections

Although the federal Bill of Rights lacks explicit right to remedy
language, 4 some controversy exists over whether the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantees a right to a
remedy. The United States Supreme Court remains undecided
whether due process requires a reasonable alternative to replace a
diminished or eliminated cause of action.4 2 In Silver v. Silver,43 the
Court emphasized that states are free to abolish or modify common
law rights.'
While the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right to a remedy
in the compensatory sense, the Court has construed, somewhat ambivalently, a federal constitutional right to a remedy in the jurisdictional
sense: access to courts in order to pursue a legal remedy.4" In Boddie
v. Connecticut,4 6 the Supreme Court faced the problem of an indigent
unable to pay the court filing fees and costs required to obtain a
divorce.4 7 The Court first noted that divorce involved "a fundamental
human relationship," and thus merited substantive due process scrutiny.4 8 The Court then reasoned that since the courts were the only
means through which a divorce could be obtained, the due process
41. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
42. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In dealing
with the Price-Anderson Act's $560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents, the
Court said, "[ilnitially, it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a
legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or
provide a reasonable substitute remedy." Id. at 88. However, the Court declined to decide that
question, concluding that the Act's assurance of a fund from which compensation would be paid
provided a reasonably just substitute for the common law or state law remedies it replaced. Id.
43. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
44. Id. at 122.
45. Apparently the only state court that has considered whether there is a state constitutional
right to a remedy in the jurisdictional sense is Washington. See Note, Constitutional Law:
Statutorily Required Mediation as a Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts; 45 Mo.
L. REV. 316, 321 n.40 (1980); see also infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
46. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
47. Id. at 371-72.
48. Id. at 383.
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clause was violated when the state prevented adequate access to the
courts in order to obtain a divorce.4 9
But two later decisions limit the right of access to cases involving
fundamental rights. In United States v. Kras,5 ° the Court refused to
recognize a discharge in bankruptcy as a fundamental interest, distinguishing the divorce situation, because "the Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to
pursue other protected associational activities.""1 A few months later,
the Court handed down Ortwein v. Schwab,52 in which the Court
decided that the right to welfare, where the recipient already had an
evidentiary hearing, was not a fundamental right which required
53
access to a court.
It is apparent from Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein that the Supreme
Court views the right of access as attaching only when the plaintiff
shows both that a fundamental interest is involved, and that there are
no other available means of obtaining a remedy for the right
involved. 4 In the absence of these two criteria, legislation need only
meet the lenient "rational relationship" level of scrutiny. 5 This
means that elimination or modification of tort remedies need only
have some rational relationship to a legitimate state end-a highly deferential judicial review of legislative decisions.

49. Id. at 382-83.
50. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
51. Id. at 444-45.
52. 410 U.S. 656 (1973). The Oregon Supreme Court had held that the remedy provision of
the Oregon constitution, article I, section 10, did not require judicial review of a state welfare
division's order to reduce welfare payments. Ortwein v. Schwab, 262 Or. 375, 498 P.2d 757
(1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
53. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 658-59.
54. See Comment, Article I, Section 21:Access to Courtsin Florida,5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871,
904 (1977).
55. See, eg., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

213

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:203, 1989

B. Equal Protection Clause Protections
Several states adopt federal equal protection analysis56 to justify an
intermediate level of scrutiny. In Carson v. Maurer,5 7 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the right to recover for personal injuries, though not a "fundamental right," involved "an important
substantive right."'5 8 Carson involved a statutory $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages. The statute created two sets of classifications.
The first classification divided tortfeasors into two groups: tortfeasors
who were health care providers, and tortfeasors who were not health
care providers. The second classification distinguished between victims: medical malpractice victims whose non-economic damages
exceeded $250,000, and those who suffered monetarily lesser damages.
The court decided that because an important right-the right to compensation for injuries-was involved, intermediate scrutiny under the
equal protection clause was appropriate, and that the classifications
were arbitrary and lacked "a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation."5 9
The problem with equal protection analysis, however, is how to
define the classifications. Hypothetically, if all medical malpractice
involving negligence was eliminated as a cause of action, it would pass
muster under equal protection analysis because everyone suffering
from negligent malpractice would be treated equally. It seems doubtful that this scenario, however improbable, would be seen as an unjustifiable classification between victims of medical negligence versus
victims of non-medical negligence. On the other hand, remedy analysis, in states which recognize heightened judicial scrutiny, works as an
affirmative mandate to provide a remedy.
56. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to give more than the briefest outline of equal
protection analysis. Equal protection "strict scrutiny" attaches when either a "suspect
classification" or impairment of a "fundamental right" is the subject of a statute. E.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial classification in absence of legislative showing of necessity
toward accomplishment of a permissible state objective was unconstitutional suspect
classification). Equal protection "intermediate scrutiny" attaches when a "quasi-suspect"
classification is involved. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"). In all other cases, some form of "rational relationship," the
lowest level of scrutiny, applies. Compare United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 177 (1980) (where legislation concerning economic and social benefits is involved, Congress
need only avoid acting in "patently arbitrary or irrational way") with F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation").
57. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
58. Carson. 424 A.2d at 830.
59. Id.
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The lack of clear federal remedy protection under either the due
process or equal protection clauses means that any protection of remedies must be provided by state constitutions. Whether the State of
Washington provides such additional protection of remedies, in article
I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, is discussed below.
IV. TORT REMEDY PROTECTIONS UNDER THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
A.

Adoption of the Washington Constitution

When the Washington Bill of Rights made its debut at the Washington Constitutional Convention on July 11, 1889, article I, section 8 of
the draft was drawn from, and virtually identical to, Oregon's article I,
section 10. The draft of the provision read: "[n]o court shall be
secret but justice shall be administered openly and without purchase,
completely and without delay, and every person shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person, property or reputation."6 1 Two weeks later, however, the provision was adopted in its
current form, "[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay."6 2 The "due course of law" language
apparently resurfaced as the "due process" language in article I, section 3.63 The remedy language was dropped altogether.
B. Intent of the Framersof the Washington Constitution
Interpreting the Washington Constitution is difficult because the
transcripts of the Washington Constitutional Convention have been
lost." The framers might have intended article I, section 10 to include
a remedy guarantee by drafting it in language significantly closer to
the original form of Magna Carta Chapter 40.6 As Coke drew remedy principles from "justice" language, so perhaps the convention del60. "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase,
completely and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury
done him in his person, property, or reputation." OR. CONST. art. I,§ 10.
61. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION, 1889, at 51, 499
n.18 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL]. Compare with OR. CONST. art. I, § 10, supra
note 60 and WASH. CONST.art. I, § 10, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
62. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also JOURNAL, supra note 61, at 154, 499.
63. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also JOURNAL, supra note 61, at 496. Note that article I,
section 3 is nearly identical to the due process clause of the federal fifth amendment, reading:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
64. See JOURNAL, supra note 61, at vii.

65. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly,
and without unnecessary delay") with Magna Carta ch. 40 ("[t]o no one will we sell, to no one
will we refuse or delay, right or justice").
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egates felt that the remedy language already was rooted in the "justice
...

without delay" language.6 6

Because the remedy language was dropped, however, the simplest
answer is that the framers did not intend to incorporate a remedy
guarantee into the Washington Constitution. The Bill of Rights submitted by Allen Weir was drawn in large part from the Oregon Constitution.67 Weir was heavily influenced by a suggested constitution
printed in the Portland Oregonian by a prominent Oregon lawyer, W.
Lair Hill.6 8 It seems circumstantially likely that the drafters were
aware of a decision handed down two years earlier interpreting the
Oregon constitutional remedy clause as protecting common law causes
of action against change by the legislature.
In Eastman v. County of Clackamas,69 plaintiff brought suit against
Clackamas County for injuries sustained from negligent maintenance
of a wooden bridge on a county road. 70 After the complaint, the Oregon legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure, allowing suits
against public corporations and officers only in cases arising on contract, though the statute previously allowed suits for "injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, arising from some act or omission .....""

In

dicta, Judge Matthew Deady reasoned that the Oregon clause, "every
man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him,"
incorporated into the constitution the remedies and causes of action
recognized at the time of the constitution's adoption. 72 Thus, according to Deady, the remedy clause preserved the cause of action and its
attendant remedy.73
66. For the full text of article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, see supra text
accompanying note 2.
67. JOURNAL, supra note 61, at 494-518 & nn.5-50.
68. Id. at v.
69. 32 F. 24 (D. Or. 1887).
70. Id. at 26-28.
71. Id. at 30-31.
72. To begin with, it may be admitted that the remedy guarantied [sic] by this provision is
not intended for the redress of any novel, indefinite, or remote injury that was not then
regarded as within the pale of legal redress. But whatever injury the law, as it then stood,
took cognizance of and furnished a remedy for, every man shall continue to have a remedy
for by due course of law. When this constitution was formed and adopted, it was and had
been the law of the land, from comparatively an early day, that a person should have an
action for damages against a county for an injury caused by its act or omission. If this then
known and accustomed remedy can be taken away in the face of this constitutional
provision, what other may not? Can the legislature, in some spasm of novel opinion, take
away every man's remedy for slander, assault and battery, or the recovery of a debt? and, if
it cannot do so in such cases, why can it in this?
Id. at 32.
73. Id.
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It is interesting to speculate what impact, if any, Judge Deady's
opinion had on the Washington convention. Of the seventy-five delegates to the convention, twenty-one were lawyers.74 Three of the lawyers present practiced previously in Oregon." It seems unlikely that
the convention was not aware of Eastman and its interpretation of a
emedy provision.
One characteristic of the convention was its concern over abuse of
legislative power-the Washington Constitution in one sense is drafted
as a limitation of legislation.7 6 It would thus be out of the framers'
character to omit another check upon the powers of the legislature.
Yet, if the convention intended to retain Coke and Blackstone's idea of
an affirmative duty to provide a remedy, the logical thing would have
been to retain the Oregon constitutional language rather than to draft
language that more closely resembles the Magna Carta.7 7 One does
not discard the "clarification" in favor of the rough draft. Since
Coke's elaboration on Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta was the basis of
the Oregon remedy provision, language resembling Coke's interpretation and not the Magna Carta would more persuasively evince an
intent to retain the remedy doctrine.
The decision to deviate from the original remedy clause drawn from
the Oregon version was perhaps influenced by post-Civil War constitutional construction and the sentiments of the Reconstruction era. The
Oregon constitution was adopted in 1859, before the adoption of the
Civil War amendments. In light of the new federal constitutional
amendments, the Washington delegates in 1889 might have felt that
78
incorporating the federal fifth amendment guarantee of due process
and a prohibition against special privileges and immunities 79 into the
Washington constitution were sufficient safeguards against the abuse
74. See Kinnear, Notes on the ConstitutionalConvention, 4 WAsH. HIsT. Q. 276, 277 (1913);
JOURNAL, supra note 61, at 465-90.

75. Washington Constitutional Convention delegates George Comegys, R.O. Dunbar, and
Austin Mires apparently practiced law in Oregon before coming to Washington. See JOURNAL,
supra note 61, at 469, 470, 480. Since they were fairly prominent in their day, they presumably
kept abreast of legal events in Oregon.
76. See Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HisT. Q.
227, 228 (1913).
Examples that manifest a distrust of legislators include article II, section 19 ("[n]o bill shall
embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title") and article II, section
28, forbidding special legislation in specific areas.
77. For the full text of Magna Carta Chapter 40, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
78. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
79. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 12: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of
citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations."
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of legislative power. 80 This, to the framers, would make remedy language and its protections unnecessary and obsolete. Because the remedy language is absent from article I, section 10, as adopted by the
Washington convention, it seems highly unlikely that it was meant to
be retained. Current Washington law is consistent with this view.
C. Current Washington Law
More than fifty years ago, the Washington Supreme Court rejected
the notion that the Washington constitution contained an affirmative
guarantee of a remedy. In Shea v. Olson,8" the Court refused to find in
the Washington constitution any justification for scrutinizing changes
in common law causes of action and remedies. In rejecting Oregon,
Delaware, and Kentucky cases that struck down guest-passenger statutes, the Washington Supreme Court pointed out that each of those
states had constitutional provisions that specifically contained remedy
provisions, while Washington's did not.8 2 "There is, therefore, no
express, positive mandate of the constitution which preserves such
rights of action from abolition by the legislature ....

.""

Instead,

Washington follows the general rule that due process does not prevent
changes in the common law; that "[t]here is neither a vested right in
an existing law which precludes its amendment or repeal nor a vested
right in the omission to legislate on a particular subject." 84
On the matter of remedy in the jurisdictional sense, the Washington
Supreme Court has been sure of the right of access, but unsure of its
80. Lebbeus J. Knapp, a delegate at the 1889 convention, wrote in 1913:
In keeping with the growing distrust of the people in legislative bodies, the constitution of
Washington... enters fully and explicitly into the field of legislative restriction .... Such is
the power to grant any person or class of persons any exclusive political honors or privileges,
and the power to abridge in any way the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Knapp, supra note 76, at 228.
81. 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936).
82. Id. at 159-60, 53 P.2d at 622; see also DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; KY. CONST. §§ 14, 54, 241;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
83. 185 Wash. at 161, 53 P.2d at 622.
While the Shea decision did not involve Washington's article I, section 10, if the framers'
intent was to preserve a right to a remedy, it is possible that the Shea court was aware of the
convention's intent. If so, then the court's refusal to find a remedy provision in the Washington
Constitution is correct in terms of framers' intent. Of the nine justices-William J. Millard, John
R. Mitchell, Warren W. Tolman, William J. Steinert, James M. Geraghty, John F. Main, O.R.
Holcomb, Walter B. Beals, and Bruce Blake--only Justice Mitchell was definitely present in
Washington at the time of the constitutional convention. Whether Justice Mitchell had any
"inside knowledge" from the conventioneers is at this point pure speculation. For brief
biographies of the 1936 Washington Supreme Court justices, see A. ALLEN, WHO'S WHO IN
WASHINGTON STATE (1929); G. BARTEAU, WHO'S WHO IN WASHINGTON STATE (1939).
84. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 962-63, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975).

218

State Constitutional Remedy Provisions
constitutional source. In Carter v. University,8 5 the court decided that
the right of access to courts was a fundamental one, because the right
of access was a right "preservative of all rights."8 6 The court later,
however, overruled the portion of Carter that grounded the right of
access -upon the right to petition the government in Housing Authority
v. Saylors.8 7 The Saylors court held that though access to the courts
could not be supported by the right of petition, "[a]ccess to the courts
is amply and expressly protected by other provisions." 8 8 Unfortunately, the court failed to detail the provisions from which it drew its
conclusions. 89
D.

The Possibility of Reform Under Article I, Section 10

Neither the Shea reasoning, nor the lack of any affirmative intent by
the Constitutional Convention, prevents the supreme court from interpreting the constitution as including a remedy doctrine in light of the
common law tradition behind article I, section 10.90 The flexibility of
having a state bill of rights lies in the state court's freedom to confer
additional rights and safeguards not recognized in the federal Constitution by the United States Supreme Court. 91
The shortcomings of the Shea approach were acknowledged by the
Washington Supreme Court that same year in Blanchard v. Golden
Age Brewing Co. 92 In striking down the operative portions of Washington's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act," 93 Justice Tolman's concurring opinion stated that some guarantee of a remedy was required:
85. 85 Wash. 2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (1975), overruled in part, Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87
Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
86. 85 Wash. 2d at 398, 536 P.2d at 623.
87. 87 Wash. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976).
88. Id. at 742, 557 P.2d at 327.
89. See id.
90. See supra Section I for a discussion of the common law tradition behind article I, section
10 of the Washington constitution.
91. See generally PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Brennan,
State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV.489 (1977); Utter,
Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the
Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491 (1984).
92. 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936).
93. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1982)), was the landmark labor act declaring the unenforceability of "yellow dog"
contracts, and severely restricting the federal courts' power of injunction in labor disputes. State
versions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act commonly are referred to as "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Acts" or "Baby Norris-LaGuardia Acts." The Washington version was the "Labor Disputes
Act," 1933 Wash. Laws Special Session 10, cited in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188
Wash. 396, 409, 63 P.2d 397, 403 (1936).
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In my opinion, the legislature may take away from the courts, as now
established, the power to protect certain rights and to exercise certain
remedies, provided that it supplies a reasonably adequate remedy in the
place of the one abolished, but by the same token the legislature may not
abolish a common law
right and its remedy without setting up some
94
reasonable substitute.

In his dissenting opinion in Blanchard, Justice Beals echoed Justice
Tolman's concern. He pointed out that abolishing a cause of action
has the same effect as denying the court jurisdiction over the case. 95
"Certainly, the complete taking of a right theretofore existing constitutes the exercise of a higher prerogative than the limiting of the relief
to be granted in an action based upon alleged violation of a right
which the legislature has still permitted to exist." 96
By interpreting article I, section 10 as including a remedy guarantee, the Washington Supreme Court could protect potential claimants
from deprivation of a remedy by a legislature motivated by political
convenience. While the court should avoid becoming a "super-legislature," imposing its own judgment against the legislature's decision to
alter or abolish a cause of action, requiring agreement between the
legislature, executive, and judiciary, would further ensure that established common law principles are not tampered with lightly. Yet if
Washington's article I, section 10 is a possible source of a remedy doctrine, the question remains as to the desired level of judicial scrutiny.
1.

The "Strict Scrutiny" Model Unwisely Makes "Super
Legislatures" of Courts

The strict scrutiny model is inadvisable because it allows a court to
pass upon the reasonableness of any alternatives offered or the reasonableness of the legislature's showing of a compelling interest. The
Kluger v. White9 7 strict scrutiny model, followed by Florida, forbids

incursions upon common law tort remedies unless either the statute
provides a reasonable alternative in place of the previous remedy, or
an "overpowering public necessity" exists to justify the incursion.9 8
Yet the difficulty of applying the "reasonable alternative" exception of
Kluger becomes clear in Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 99 In
Mahoney, a plaintiff's workers' compensation award was held to have
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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188 Wash. at 426-27, 63 P.2d at 410 (Tolman, J., concurring).
Id. at 443-44, 63 P.2d at 417 (Beals, J., dissenting).
Id. at 445, 63 P.2d at 417; see also supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 4.
440 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1983).
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fully paid his medical care and wage-loss benefits during his recovery.
Though the $1200 award for the 80% loss of vision in one eye "may
appear inadequate and unfair," it was not unconstitutional under the
access to courts for redress of an injury provision." °° Because "reasonableness" is as much a subjective question on the part of the judiciary as it is for the legislature, it becomes difficult to see whether a
judicial assessment of "reasonable alternative" has any practical
advantages.
A recent example of the potential for overly intrusive inquiries into
legislative decisions is Smith v. Departmentof Insurance.1° 1 In Smith,
the Florida Supreme Court struck down a $450,000 cap on
noneconomic damages in tort suits. The court held that there was
neither an alternative remedy nor commensurate benefit to plaintiffs in
tort suits who otherwise would have recovered the full value of their
noneconomic damages.'
And though recovery was not totally abolished, the Kluger rule would not allow the cap without a rational alternative or overpowering necessity. Otherwise, "if the legislature may
constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there is no discernible reason why it could not cap the recovery at some other figure, perhaps
° The Smith court added that the
$50,000, or $1,000, or even $1." 103
importance of the access to courts for redress of injuries was to withstand attacks by "majoritarian whim" against traditional rights of
action. '4
But the Florida legislature had expressly found that the lack of liability insurance constituted an overpowering necessity for tort
reform. 105 The Florida court ignored this legislative finding and substituted its own judgment. 10 6 Traditionally, it is objectionable for a
court to substitute its own findings in economic and societal matters
for those of the legislature.'0 7 Thus, Smith illustrates the difficulty of
allowing a court too much discretion to override articulated legislative
purposes.
100. Id. at 1286.
101. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
102. Id. at 1088.

103. Id. at 1089.
104. Id.
105. See Note, The Constitutionality ofPlorida'sCap On Noneconomic Damages in the Tort
Reform and InsuranceAct of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 157, 165 (1987).
106. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
107. See, ag., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (rejecting "lochnerizing"
substantive due process by inquiring into wisdom of economic policy made by legislatures since
"courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal [in economic matters]").
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Another problem with the Kluger strict scrutiny approach is that
causes of action created after the adoption of the constitution are
treated with less respect. While causes of action and their attendant
remedies predating the constitution are protected by Florida's remedy
provision, causes of action arising after the constitution's adoption are
not incorporated within the remedy provision.10 8 It seems troubling to
assume that legislation enacted before a particular date is worthy of
more consideration than legislation passed afterwards.
2.

The "No Restriction" Model Fails to Provide an Important
Check Upon Legislatures

The "no restriction" model allows the legislature maximum control
in changing or abolishing causes of action. It avoids the idea that remedy provisions are intended to freeze tort law as it existed at the adoption of the state's constitution. Instead, remedy provisions are
interpreted as a procedural guarantee of a remedy under the substantive law, and the legislature's role is to formulate the substantive law
without hindrance from the judiciary.1" 9
While the courts are not free to pass upon the wisdom of a change in
the common law, one commentator points out that courts would still
retain a "prescriptive" use of the remedy provision. 1 ' In the "prescriptive" sense, a constitutional remedy provision requires that when
a lawmaker creates or recognizes a legal injury in the substantive law,
108. See McPhail v. Jenkins, 382 So. 2d 1329, 1330-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Kluger
analysis not applicable to statutory change in wrongful death statute, because no right of
recovery for wrongful death at common law when Florida wrongful death statute passed in 1972;
remedy guarantee protects only common law and statutory remedies acknowledged at time
Florida constitution re-adopted in 1968).
It is worth pointing out that Kluger strict scrutiny does not, therefore, apply to additional torts
recognized after the adoption of the Florida constitution. In comparison, scrutiny under the
federal due process clause and equal protection clause applies to all legislation, whether the new
statute changes a previously recognized tort or recognizes a new tort. This makes the strict
scrutiny model under a remedy provision less broad in scope than strict scrutiny under either the
due process clause or the equal protection clause.
109. At least two commentators have argued in favor of this approach over any judicial
scrutiny-types of interpretation of remedy provisions. Linde, supra note 14, at 136-38;
Schuman, supra note 10, at 69-71; see also Davidson v. Rogers, 281 Or. 219, 574 P.2d 624,
625-26 (1978) (Linde, J., concurring) (footnote omitted):
The guarantee in article I, section 10, of a "remedy by due course of law for injury done
[one] in his person, property, or reputation" is part of a section dealing with the
administration of justice. It is a plaintiffs' clause, addressed to securing the right to set the
machinery of the law in motion to recover for harm already done to one stated kinds [sic] of
interest, a guarantee that dates by way of the original state constitutions of 1776 back to
King John's promise in Magna Charta chapter 40 .... It is concerned with securing a
remedy from those who administer the law, through courts or otherwise.
110. Schuman, supra note 10, at 67-71.

222

State Constitutional Remedy Provisions
a legal remedy also comes into being."' If the legislation lacks provision for a remedy, the courts should be able to fashion a remedy to
match the injury.112 An illusory remedy does not pass muster under
the prescriptive use theory. Though abolishing tort actions would survive constitutional attack based on the remedy provision, assuming the
change survived federal due process and equal protection challenges, a
statutory remedy provision of $1 for noneconomic tort damages would
be considered arbitrary and would not survive.
While the prescriptive use theory of interpreting remedy guarantees
is attractive for its clarity, the theory avoids the question whether judicial scrutiny is needed when changes to the common law arise. Bothersome in its interference with the legislative process, usage of remedy
provisions to scrutinize legislation nonetheless has the benefit of protecting a possible victim's access to the proper judicial or quasi-judicial
body for relief." 3
3. An Altered Version of the "'IntermediateScrutiny" Model Is
Appropriate
Compared with Florida's Kluger strict scrutiny analysis, Texas'
Sax 114 intermediate scrutiny approach is more accomodating to the
legislative role in defining causes of action and their attendant remedies. Whereas the Kluger approach holds changes to the common law
immediately suspect, the Sax approach presumes constitutionality,
placing the burden of showing unconstitutionality upon the plaintiff.
The Sax approach also offers the litigant a chance to show that the
legislation constitutes either an unreasonable or arbitrary burden in
excess of the intended benefits of the statute. Thus, the intermediate
111. Ird.
112. Id. at 69.
113. As written by Justice Sloan in his dissenting opinion in Holden v. PioneerBroadcasting
Co.:
The deference we should pay to legislative action within the legislative function is not that
which should be given to legislation when it limits or denies access to a court for the redress
of wrong committed. All too often such attempted restrictions have been for the benefit of
the few at the loss of the many ....
•.. For it must be remembered that when the legislature abolishes a cause of action to
benefit a favored few it must be taken to be because the courts have failed to protect the
rights of the few. It is a recognition that the courts have allowed fraud or partiality to warp
the course of justice. When the courts sustain the act it is a tacit acknowledgment not only
of the failure to dispense justice but also an admission that the courts cannot remedy the
wrong, if one exists.
228 Or. 405, 365 P.2d 845, 865 (1961) (Sloan, J.,dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 157 (1962).
114. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
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approach allows more flexibility to the legislature in instituting tort
reform.
On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny puts the court in the position of balancing costs and benefits when the legislature has presumably already done so." 5 A single judge, or even a panel of judges, is
unlikely to be more able to assess the costs and benefits of a change in
legislation than a state legislature. Tort reform is almost always justified as an economic measure aimed at deflating the "insurance crisis,"
and when it comes to the economic arena, courts generally recognize16
that they are the inappropriate forum to assess legislative decisions.'
Yet the principles behind intermediate scrutiny offer the logical
alternative model for Washington. While the intermediate model is
not without flaws, it is more consistent with Washington law. In Shea,
the Washington court ignored the argument for recognizing a fundamental right to freedom from bodily harm.'" 7 Yet there is some recent
recognition of the right to compensation for personal injuries as being
a substantial right. In Hunter v. North Mason School District,118 the
Washington Supreme Court held that "[t]he right to be indemnified
for personal injuries is a substantial property right ...

"119

The court

in Hunter then applied the equal protection intermediate scrutiny test.
To reconcile the Hunter result with Shea, it would be theoretically
permissible to apply the intermediate remedy scrutiny in Washington.
Despite the court's failure in Shea to examine the theory behind article
I, section 10, the modem court has the option of incorporating Coke's
interpretation of a remedy guarantee into article I, section 10.120 Considering that the court in Hunter recognized that the right to compensation for injuries was a substantial right, thus meriting equal
protection intermediate scrutiny, invoking intermediate scrutiny under
115. A recent example of the intrusive nature of the intermediate scrutiny balancing text is
Lucas v. United States, No. C-6181, slip op. 1988 WL 45,162 (Tex. May 11, 1988) (WESTLAW,
TX-CS database). In an opinion responding to a state law question certified to it by the Fifth
Circuit, Lucas v. United States, 811 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1987), the Texas Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages. The court found that based on one
study, "there is no relationship between a damage cap and increases in insurance rates" and thus
the restrictions imposed by the statutory cap were unreasonable and arbitrary under the Sax test.
116. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
117. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936). The argument urging that the right
to life included freedom from bodily harm was made in Brief of Respondent at 48-49, Shea v.
Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936) (No. 25,800). The Shea court also ignored the
arguments that the right to recover for injuries was a property right. Id. at 49-52.
118. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
119. Id.at 814, 539 P.2d at 848.
120. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text for a discussion on the common law
interpretation of remedy provisions.
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a constitutional remedy guarantee as authority would least disrupt the
current state of Washington law.
Any judicial scrutiny model for Washington should give great deference to actual legislative findings, and avoid the intrusions into legislative findings inherent in the strict scrutiny model."' Where actual
legislative findings are clear and available, the court should accept
those findings. The court should not speculate whether a change in
tort law is "reasonable or arbitrary" when compared to the new statute's purpose and basis unless there are no legislative findings
22
available. 1
A final concern is the relationship of a remedy clause to the concept
of court access. The first clause of article I, section 10 provides that
"[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered ... ." In a grammatical
sense, the clause refers to the administration of justice, which includes
access to a court. The historical roots of remedy provisions include a
desire to make access to justice a right.'2 3 Therefore, the right of
access to a court can logically be attributed to the administration of
justice clause.
This does not mean, however, that claims must be submitted to a
court. Even under the strict scrutiny model of Kluger, justice administered on an administrative level is permissible as a reasonable alternative to the common law court system."2 According to Justice Linde of
the Oregon Supreme Court, administration of justice is "a plaintiffs'
clause, addressed to securing the right to set the machinery of the law
in motion to recover for harm already done... It is concerned with
securing a remedy from those who administer the law, through courts
or otherwise."' 25 Thus at the very least, the Washington Supreme
Court can find the constitutional guarantee of access to courts rooted
in article I, section 10, and that access means the ability to obtain
whatever recovery the law allows.
V.

CONCLUSION

Article I, section 10 has a pedigree rich in possibilities. Within this
provision, the right of access to courts in Washington can at last find a
constitutional grounding. The provision can also become a guarantee
121. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text for a critique of the strict scrutiny model.
122. For a discussion of the desirability of an actual purpose inquiry in the equal protection
context, see Gunther, In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Modelfor a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV.L. REv. 1, 43-48 (1972).
123. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
125. Davidson v. Rogers, 281 Or. 219, 574 P.2d 624, 625-26 (1978) (Linde, J., concurring).
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of the right to a remedy, protecting tort victims from future inroads by
the legislature into their right to recover. The Washington Constitutional Convention probably did not intend article I, section 10 to function as a remedy provision. Yet with even less material, and without
the benefit of the experiences of other states, Sir Edward Coke was
able to fashion a remedy guarantee from the Magna Carta. It may be
desirable for the Washington Supreme Court to do the same.
Janice Sue Wang
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